"La Mujer en Iran"
From the first paragraph:
"We arrive at this point from these lines to explain, although succinctly, the situation of women in Iran. Unfortunately, this has been a topic often used in the West to complain about Iran since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, centering the debates in trivial questions about the veil without taking into account the fact that it has been used to retain modesty throughout the history of Iran - for all women, it was freedom to veil or not to veil."
My Spanish isn't good enough to really go through thoroughly and read, but the images speak for themselves. As a collection, they break through some firmly held stereotypes and offer a great portrait of a population within Iran.
Tuesday, December 4, 2007
Monday, December 3, 2007
Homosexual Advocacy and Islam: Emphasizing "Sameness", Rather Than "Otherness"
p. 113/114 - Brian Whitaker introduces a very interesting tidbit criticizing the international gay rights activists for "oversimplifying the problem" when focusing on Muslim countries. Their oversimplification, according to Whitaker, means attributing intolerance to religion and/or culture (which, presumably, are perceived as immutable and static).
Yes, yes! This is almost exactly mirroring the original feminists' position in the West and its "gaze" into the East during the early and mid-20th century. There are two huge parallels:
1) Gay rights activists are just becoming accepted in the West, and have broadened their scope to "liberating" those who are still oppressed, in their eyes. This mirrors the development of feminism and its subsequent focus on liberating the "veiled and oppressed Muslim woman" during the 20th century.
2) Gay rights activism has now become a "homegrown" phenomenon - much like the adoption of the feminist paradigm into the Middle East, there are now gay rights activists within the Middle East themselves. Although, like the early feminists, they have little room for public protest and/or visibility, they are becoming a more dominant force for social reform with regards to gay rights.
So, what does Whitaker suggest reform-minded activists focus on? Social reform, with little resort to using terminology such as "culture" or "religion" when looking for reasons for the lack of gay rights. "A different and perhaps more profitable way of addressing the problem is to pay less attention to the 'otherness' of Arab-Islamic culture and more attention to its sameness".
So here, Whitaker is taking a position a little bit different than my previous post: it is our sameness that drives our common interests and our the "lowest common denominator" (so to speak) will unite individuals across borders.
I have a couple issues with this (I discussed this a little bit earlier with regards to my criticisms of Satrapi's Embroideries). First, we must respect our differences - which often presents a contradictory reality: respecting differences across nations, but also within nations. The notion of respect of differences is very much a Western, American ideal in the first place. Do we chastise those who do not accept our values for not accepting the values of their "others"? Strange paradox there. Of course, I'm not calling for pure cultural relativism. Things like human rights must be respected, but I'm not sure the UN Declaration of Human Rights necessarily makes sense as a pretext for unfettered gay activism in the Middle East... If we are to prosecute all countries violating human rights, most of the US government themselves would be jailed in international courts...
Next, taking a teleological viewpoint - even of social reform (as Whitaker suggests is done), may ignite the usual conflict between the hard-liner religious scholars and the international gay rights activists. Imposing a model of "social development" is not always the best way to inspire reform - if reform is even necessary. Western focus on identifying oneself with one's sexuality is often confusing to Arab youth, who are constrained by a culture (or society) that does not support sexual identification (or takes heterosexual identification as a given for 'male-ness').
Whitaker's book excels in its research, but leaves many questions unasked. How has the process of identifying with one's sexuality changed within Middle Eastern cultures versus that of Western cultures? What are the minimal requirements for reform from gay rights organizations within the area, but also outside of the area? How have homosexual practices changed in the centuries in the region? (He touches on that a little bit), and why does homosexuality need to become a public identity, rather than a private one?
Many issues still need resolution here... There is not one answer that will fit the "Muslim world". Each country will develop at its own pace, although this does not rule out the idea that international pressure can ensure that human rights abuses are not taking place...
Yes, yes! This is almost exactly mirroring the original feminists' position in the West and its "gaze" into the East during the early and mid-20th century. There are two huge parallels:
1) Gay rights activists are just becoming accepted in the West, and have broadened their scope to "liberating" those who are still oppressed, in their eyes. This mirrors the development of feminism and its subsequent focus on liberating the "veiled and oppressed Muslim woman" during the 20th century.
2) Gay rights activism has now become a "homegrown" phenomenon - much like the adoption of the feminist paradigm into the Middle East, there are now gay rights activists within the Middle East themselves. Although, like the early feminists, they have little room for public protest and/or visibility, they are becoming a more dominant force for social reform with regards to gay rights.
So, what does Whitaker suggest reform-minded activists focus on? Social reform, with little resort to using terminology such as "culture" or "religion" when looking for reasons for the lack of gay rights. "A different and perhaps more profitable way of addressing the problem is to pay less attention to the 'otherness' of Arab-Islamic culture and more attention to its sameness".
So here, Whitaker is taking a position a little bit different than my previous post: it is our sameness that drives our common interests and our the "lowest common denominator" (so to speak) will unite individuals across borders.
I have a couple issues with this (I discussed this a little bit earlier with regards to my criticisms of Satrapi's Embroideries). First, we must respect our differences - which often presents a contradictory reality: respecting differences across nations, but also within nations. The notion of respect of differences is very much a Western, American ideal in the first place. Do we chastise those who do not accept our values for not accepting the values of their "others"? Strange paradox there. Of course, I'm not calling for pure cultural relativism. Things like human rights must be respected, but I'm not sure the UN Declaration of Human Rights necessarily makes sense as a pretext for unfettered gay activism in the Middle East... If we are to prosecute all countries violating human rights, most of the US government themselves would be jailed in international courts...
Next, taking a teleological viewpoint - even of social reform (as Whitaker suggests is done), may ignite the usual conflict between the hard-liner religious scholars and the international gay rights activists. Imposing a model of "social development" is not always the best way to inspire reform - if reform is even necessary. Western focus on identifying oneself with one's sexuality is often confusing to Arab youth, who are constrained by a culture (or society) that does not support sexual identification (or takes heterosexual identification as a given for 'male-ness').
Whitaker's book excels in its research, but leaves many questions unasked. How has the process of identifying with one's sexuality changed within Middle Eastern cultures versus that of Western cultures? What are the minimal requirements for reform from gay rights organizations within the area, but also outside of the area? How have homosexual practices changed in the centuries in the region? (He touches on that a little bit), and why does homosexuality need to become a public identity, rather than a private one?
Many issues still need resolution here... There is not one answer that will fit the "Muslim world". Each country will develop at its own pace, although this does not rule out the idea that international pressure can ensure that human rights abuses are not taking place...
Embroideries: A Direct Connection to the West
Marjane Satrapi's Embroideries is, like her other works, highly entertaining and an extremely fun read. Like Persepolis, her subtle wit, imagination, and fine storytelling make for a vivid picture of Iranian private life - this time focused on the hidden worlds of gossiping women. These women, as depicted by Satrapi, are much like their Western counterparts - chatting away about other families', friends', and lovers' sexual lives and encounters.
One reviewer (from Madison's Capital Times) praises Embroideries as "most effectively tearing down the divide between Iranian and American culture, showing how women everywhere are similar". This is certainly true! Embroideries was written for a Western audience without doubt. With the success of her Persepolis series of graphic novels, it is no surprise this is the audience she would aim for.
And while it is all fine and dandy to be light-hearted and present this entertaining side of Iranian life, it might also be a bit misleading. To me, the most entertaining, intellectually-stimulating, eye-opening books are not those that attempt to present all of us as essentially the same people in different places. Martyn, this is somewhat like your criticism of Babel, if I remember correctly - saying that it is somewhat misleading in presenting this image of humanity as simply the same, but speaking different languages.
The biggest danger I see in this style of representation is that it presumes that all Iranian women are "just like us", and therefore that perhaps Western values and styles of living would be proper or best for all Iranians. It would reinforce this view of the veil as oppressive, and women as oppressed bodies, simply waiting for a private space to enact their Western tendencies and talk about their sex lives...
That said, it is a good little novel about the elite (and it might be fair to say that most of the elite Iranian women may all be similar to these liberal elites). In presenting these similarities, it might be offering something to avoid the usual Western "gaze at the Other", that so many intellectuals warn about...
Nit-picking! But, it's just personal preference...
One reviewer (from Madison's Capital Times) praises Embroideries as "most effectively tearing down the divide between Iranian and American culture, showing how women everywhere are similar". This is certainly true! Embroideries was written for a Western audience without doubt. With the success of her Persepolis series of graphic novels, it is no surprise this is the audience she would aim for.
And while it is all fine and dandy to be light-hearted and present this entertaining side of Iranian life, it might also be a bit misleading. To me, the most entertaining, intellectually-stimulating, eye-opening books are not those that attempt to present all of us as essentially the same people in different places. Martyn, this is somewhat like your criticism of Babel, if I remember correctly - saying that it is somewhat misleading in presenting this image of humanity as simply the same, but speaking different languages.
The biggest danger I see in this style of representation is that it presumes that all Iranian women are "just like us", and therefore that perhaps Western values and styles of living would be proper or best for all Iranians. It would reinforce this view of the veil as oppressive, and women as oppressed bodies, simply waiting for a private space to enact their Western tendencies and talk about their sex lives...
That said, it is a good little novel about the elite (and it might be fair to say that most of the elite Iranian women may all be similar to these liberal elites). In presenting these similarities, it might be offering something to avoid the usual Western "gaze at the Other", that so many intellectuals warn about...
Nit-picking! But, it's just personal preference...
Monday, November 26, 2007
The Ideal Muslim Woman: Changing Values In Changing Societies
I was particularly struck by the Mir-Hosseini's illustration of the changing status of Fatima Zahra, the Prophet's daughter and wife of his cousin, Ali. The official Iranian discourse, according to Mir-Hosseini, portrays Fatmina as embodying Islamic ideals of womanhood, dating since a mid-1970's lecturer addressed the crisis of identity faced by women in Iran. The speaker, Hoseiniyeh Ershad, urged all women to follow Fatima's example as ideal: embracing the values of defiance, struggle, and protest against tyranny and unjustice.
Since the Islamic Revolution, Fatima as a role model has fit neatly as a source of legitimacy for Islamic gender discourses. However, Fatima and her image have undergone a critical transformation: she no longer stands for defiance, struggle, and protest, but for chastity, piety, and submission. The image remains, but its value is transformed to reflect that of a changed society.
Of similar interest (and somehow related, although I'm not exactly sure how) is the change in discourse regarding women before and after the Revolution. "Whereas old narratives were silent on women's social roles, the new ones accept women's participation in society and politics, but they retain the traditionalist assumptions about gender" (Mir-Hosseini,49). A critical political shift created perspective changes, but not necessarily ideological ones. The recognition of women as active agents in social reality and changing religious imagery seem somehow related - and further, they seem to testify to this grand idea of the fusion between religious dogma and social ideologies. But do social realities have exclusive rights to change religious discourse, or is this a two-way street? What are the limits of an Islamic empire?
Somehow, I think we're back to this idea of holding Islam accountable (perhaps I have abandoned that terminology - accountable for what?)... I still ask - what are its common denominators? For example, I think it is Bouhdiba who mentions that Muslim life is, in some fundamental way, always looking backwards to the traditions: the Sunna, hadith, and an ancient written text. In its quest for perfection and alignment with the divine way...might that be the essential trait? But then, is it unique to Islam, or just more dominant of an ideology?
I digress...
Since the Islamic Revolution, Fatima as a role model has fit neatly as a source of legitimacy for Islamic gender discourses. However, Fatima and her image have undergone a critical transformation: she no longer stands for defiance, struggle, and protest, but for chastity, piety, and submission. The image remains, but its value is transformed to reflect that of a changed society.
Of similar interest (and somehow related, although I'm not exactly sure how) is the change in discourse regarding women before and after the Revolution. "Whereas old narratives were silent on women's social roles, the new ones accept women's participation in society and politics, but they retain the traditionalist assumptions about gender" (Mir-Hosseini,49). A critical political shift created perspective changes, but not necessarily ideological ones. The recognition of women as active agents in social reality and changing religious imagery seem somehow related - and further, they seem to testify to this grand idea of the fusion between religious dogma and social ideologies. But do social realities have exclusive rights to change religious discourse, or is this a two-way street? What are the limits of an Islamic empire?
Somehow, I think we're back to this idea of holding Islam accountable (perhaps I have abandoned that terminology - accountable for what?)... I still ask - what are its common denominators? For example, I think it is Bouhdiba who mentions that Muslim life is, in some fundamental way, always looking backwards to the traditions: the Sunna, hadith, and an ancient written text. In its quest for perfection and alignment with the divine way...might that be the essential trait? But then, is it unique to Islam, or just more dominant of an ideology?
I digress...
Altorki and "Women in Saudi Arabia"
Soraya Altorki's Women in Saudi Arabia depicts patterns of continuity and change within three generations of Jeddah elite - focusing particularly on women. Of primary importance is Altorki's assertion that social change articulates with ideological changes and creates new strategies and opportunities for women in Saudi Arabian society. According to Altorki, it is elite Saudi families that are leading the changes and spreading these new social practices and beliefs to the rest of Saudi society.
The strength of the work is in her depiction of how the population's views and ideologies have created social change through the generations. Any ethnography about Saudi Arabia without a keen awareness of the rapidly changing social dynamics would be severely crippled, and as a Saudi citizen, Altorki is highly sensitive to this reality. Her ethnographic approach, by nature of her Saudi citizenship, forces her to avoid viewing her population as a "static" Other. She's writing as a Saudi herself - thus, she cannot be criticized, as many have, as attempting to understanding the culture from the outside.
Although extremely outdated (published in '86), she tackles some critical issues within the Kingdom. For instance, how are women renegotiating the practice of veiling? Younger generations fear divine retribution less than they fear the social stigma that attaches to shameless behavior. Limits to exposure are culturally negotiable, and these negotiations take place in a framework of fused social norms and religious dogma. Community norms (especially for unmarried girls) operate as double edged sword: protective, but also punishing if social codes are violated.
Thus, women in elite families have been reinterpreting their ideology by choosing to give nuance to particular significations (and not others) within the range of meanings the dominant Saudi ideology encompasses. They are actively interpreting and otherwise modifying patterns of meaning featured in the established ideology (presumed as religious). This is the strategy of reform between the generations, and serves to widen the gap between official Wahhabi dogma and "on-the-ground" understandings of social norms and religious practices.
Altorki's ethnography also serves to break some stereotypical images of the submissive and powerless Saudi female. In detailing women's domination over the world of arranged marriages, Altorki illustrates how it is actually women that have control over society's reproduction - not men. It is, in fact, their segregation from men that allow them this type of control. But unanswered is how new social practices (such as consensual, independently-controlled marriages based on "love" between one man and one woman) might reinforce, undermine, or reshape women's roles in Saudi society.
The work, well-researched and well-written, offers a great insight into an otherwise elusive culture. The life and role of Saudi women has often been treated simply as exotic and/or ignored. Today, however, more and more Saudis are emerging as academics - in a global sense - and providing us with highly informative vignettes. Altorki, especially as a Saudi woman, has done her readers a great service.
The strength of the work is in her depiction of how the population's views and ideologies have created social change through the generations. Any ethnography about Saudi Arabia without a keen awareness of the rapidly changing social dynamics would be severely crippled, and as a Saudi citizen, Altorki is highly sensitive to this reality. Her ethnographic approach, by nature of her Saudi citizenship, forces her to avoid viewing her population as a "static" Other. She's writing as a Saudi herself - thus, she cannot be criticized, as many have, as attempting to understanding the culture from the outside.
Although extremely outdated (published in '86), she tackles some critical issues within the Kingdom. For instance, how are women renegotiating the practice of veiling? Younger generations fear divine retribution less than they fear the social stigma that attaches to shameless behavior. Limits to exposure are culturally negotiable, and these negotiations take place in a framework of fused social norms and religious dogma. Community norms (especially for unmarried girls) operate as double edged sword: protective, but also punishing if social codes are violated.
Thus, women in elite families have been reinterpreting their ideology by choosing to give nuance to particular significations (and not others) within the range of meanings the dominant Saudi ideology encompasses. They are actively interpreting and otherwise modifying patterns of meaning featured in the established ideology (presumed as religious). This is the strategy of reform between the generations, and serves to widen the gap between official Wahhabi dogma and "on-the-ground" understandings of social norms and religious practices.
Altorki's ethnography also serves to break some stereotypical images of the submissive and powerless Saudi female. In detailing women's domination over the world of arranged marriages, Altorki illustrates how it is actually women that have control over society's reproduction - not men. It is, in fact, their segregation from men that allow them this type of control. But unanswered is how new social practices (such as consensual, independently-controlled marriages based on "love" between one man and one woman) might reinforce, undermine, or reshape women's roles in Saudi society.
The work, well-researched and well-written, offers a great insight into an otherwise elusive culture. The life and role of Saudi women has often been treated simply as exotic and/or ignored. Today, however, more and more Saudis are emerging as academics - in a global sense - and providing us with highly informative vignettes. Altorki, especially as a Saudi woman, has done her readers a great service.
Monday, November 19, 2007
Sex Change in Iran?: Two Competing Dialogues
Mir-Hosseini's investigations into the contemporary discourses on gender and sexual relations in Iran present a world dominated by textual interpretation, judicial rulings, and traditional duties. It is a world, like Bouhdiba's, where the sexes are firmly segregated by a divine law.
For me, one of the most interesting discussions in Mir-Hosseini's work regards Grand Ayatollah Madani's exegesis and rulings on "Problems" - questions submitted to him for clarification and published in a consistently updated book he releases to the general public. One of the questions deals with hermaphrodites and the possibility of sex change. This is a profound, yet naturally occurring challenge to the dichotomy and strict segregation of sexes - a person born in-between these two very opposite humanities.
So, what does Madani say about sex change for a hermaphrodite (or a conflicted man or woman who desires it)?
However, in the case of a hermaphrodite, because there is the possibility of either maleness or femaleness, a medical specialist may make the decisions as to which is most appropriate, and then surgery is permissible.
But, the unnaturalness of the creation of sexes, to Madani, is never overlooked. Humans cannot make a "really barren" woman give birth, nor can they make a man give birth with an operation. This, to Madani, proves that real change has not taken place. Sex remains in the realm of the infinite knowledge and power of God.
But what about this?
"Changing one's sexual identity is not forbidden by religion." Yet, by Madani's examination, it certainly is. Any mutilation of vital organs (including penis or vagina) is against hadith.
If there is a huge strength of Mir-Hosseini's work it in her illustration of the competing discourses between religious scholars and their underlying natures. Are there political dimensions to these understandings of an "immutable Islam"? Of course. Why might Khomeini allow this to happen, but Madani condemn it with reference to scripture and hadith? Why might Madani's analysis be dismissed or thrown out (as it seems to have been - his work was written in 1997, the broadcast aired in 2005) and Khomeini's accepted? These are the political, economic dimensions of Islamic culture which fascinate.
For me, one of the most interesting discussions in Mir-Hosseini's work regards Grand Ayatollah Madani's exegesis and rulings on "Problems" - questions submitted to him for clarification and published in a consistently updated book he releases to the general public. One of the questions deals with hermaphrodites and the possibility of sex change. This is a profound, yet naturally occurring challenge to the dichotomy and strict segregation of sexes - a person born in-between these two very opposite humanities.
So, what does Madani say about sex change for a hermaphrodite (or a conflicted man or woman who desires it)?
"Sex change by means of surgery in a person who is essentially man or woman is not permitted; and according to the shari'a it is not correct to remove a man's testicles and penis by surgery and make him a vagina, even if he feels emotionally a woman [and vice versa]..." (Mir-Housseni, 36).
However, in the case of a hermaphrodite, because there is the possibility of either maleness or femaleness, a medical specialist may make the decisions as to which is most appropriate, and then surgery is permissible.
But, the unnaturalness of the creation of sexes, to Madani, is never overlooked. Humans cannot make a "really barren" woman give birth, nor can they make a man give birth with an operation. This, to Madani, proves that real change has not taken place. Sex remains in the realm of the infinite knowledge and power of God.
But what about this?
"Changing one's sexual identity is not forbidden by religion." Yet, by Madani's examination, it certainly is. Any mutilation of vital organs (including penis or vagina) is against hadith.
If there is a huge strength of Mir-Hosseini's work it in her illustration of the competing discourses between religious scholars and their underlying natures. Are there political dimensions to these understandings of an "immutable Islam"? Of course. Why might Khomeini allow this to happen, but Madani condemn it with reference to scripture and hadith? Why might Madani's analysis be dismissed or thrown out (as it seems to have been - his work was written in 1997, the broadcast aired in 2005) and Khomeini's accepted? These are the political, economic dimensions of Islamic culture which fascinate.
Sunday, November 18, 2007
Sexuality in Islam pt.1: Bouhdiba's Perspective on Homosexuality
This work introduces a new facet of our study this term of gender study within the Islamic consciousness and societies: that of sexuality. Bouhdiba's work is certainly coming from an "insider" Muslim position, but his analysis of sexuality's place within Islam is certainly unique and quite nuanced.
His first move is to illustrate what he believes to be a fundamental element not only in sexuality within the Islamic world, but in all things. "Everything is double and that is the sign of the divine miracle," he notes in his first sentence. "Bivalence is the will of God...and sexuality, which is the relating of male and female, is merely and particular case of an absolutely universal devine wish" (p.7). Sexuality, to Bouhdiba, is a continuous, ever-renewing search for an ultimate unity.
Furthermore, sexuality, as a means to procreation, is THE "sacred mission". It is a unification of life's devotion to divinity: "In assuming [the mission], man takes part in a divine work whose majesty is enough to give a new meaning to his existence" (p.13).
These two fundamental elements to understanding sexuality foreshadow Bouhdiba's extremely critical and negative view of homosexuality within Islam. As duality and separation of the sexes is paramount in Islam, any violation of this is deemed heretical. In particular, male homosexuality (liwat) incurs the strongest condemnation - it is identified with zina and punished dearly. Bouhdiba goes as far as to say that it is the "great sexual taboo of Islam", as it violates the "order of the world". Satisfaction thus must only come from legitimate pleasures within the framework of nikah, the legal, socialized form of the sexual relation.
By subverting procreation (the divine mission) and violating the divine order and quest for unity, male homosexuality becomes one of the biggest no-no's within Islam's sexual code of conduct.
Of course, what this neglects is the differences between ideal and real cultural practices. Within any culture, there are strong differences between idealized moral codes and actual practices that strive for those ideals. How has the label of homosexuality been used historically in Muslim societies in the Middle East? What constitutes and homosexual act, according to Bouhdiba? And the label of a homosexual - how is it applied? When did sexuality become a part of individuals' identities? I'm curious to see other authors' perspectives on homosexuality within Islam and Islamic societies.
His first move is to illustrate what he believes to be a fundamental element not only in sexuality within the Islamic world, but in all things. "Everything is double and that is the sign of the divine miracle," he notes in his first sentence. "Bivalence is the will of God...and sexuality, which is the relating of male and female, is merely and particular case of an absolutely universal devine wish" (p.7). Sexuality, to Bouhdiba, is a continuous, ever-renewing search for an ultimate unity.
Furthermore, sexuality, as a means to procreation, is THE "sacred mission". It is a unification of life's devotion to divinity: "In assuming [the mission], man takes part in a divine work whose majesty is enough to give a new meaning to his existence" (p.13).
These two fundamental elements to understanding sexuality foreshadow Bouhdiba's extremely critical and negative view of homosexuality within Islam. As duality and separation of the sexes is paramount in Islam, any violation of this is deemed heretical. In particular, male homosexuality (liwat) incurs the strongest condemnation - it is identified with zina and punished dearly. Bouhdiba goes as far as to say that it is the "great sexual taboo of Islam", as it violates the "order of the world". Satisfaction thus must only come from legitimate pleasures within the framework of nikah, the legal, socialized form of the sexual relation.
By subverting procreation (the divine mission) and violating the divine order and quest for unity, male homosexuality becomes one of the biggest no-no's within Islam's sexual code of conduct.
Of course, what this neglects is the differences between ideal and real cultural practices. Within any culture, there are strong differences between idealized moral codes and actual practices that strive for those ideals. How has the label of homosexuality been used historically in Muslim societies in the Middle East? What constitutes and homosexual act, according to Bouhdiba? And the label of a homosexual - how is it applied? When did sexuality become a part of individuals' identities? I'm curious to see other authors' perspectives on homosexuality within Islam and Islamic societies.
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